Abstract: Policy implication about satisfactions of energy use and housing are much sensitive to social discount rate changes, which can increase the dissatisfaction of residential happiness because of an increasing price mechanism when 'per capita' resource faces to decline. We thus estimate the private expected rates of return on ecological investment to improve urban and peri-urban environmental infrastructures are about to 7.54% and 18.37% respectively. The endogeneities of income and saving rise can increase the uncertain part of private discount rate up to a higher estimated subjective social discount rate about 14.46% for urban or 8.86% for peri-urban environmental infrastructures improvement. The estimated time preference rate can be raised from 1‰ to 1.72‰. The prediction of these estimated private discount rate can ease at least 20% of the dissatisfaction to energy use and 10% of the dissatisfaction to housing conditions. Therefore, we suggest opening the landscape rights to individual willingness-to-invest, and providing options to let people pay a part of their pensions for temporal permits to living in some well-served villages where are close to the places with advanced environmental amenities and being supported by central planning policy via the crowdfunding operation for improving environmental quality.
Introduction
Before this paper written, COP21/CMP11 at Paris 2015 proposed a much more flexible plan for multilateral cooperation of emission mitigation. It presents a bottom-up framework design reflecting the initiative 'acceptance' of emission mitigation in every participating country. This logic is clear that a bottom-up scheme has an initial level in a country. However, it is uncertain that sub-national regulations and individual choices for ecologically friendly behaviors.
The initiative 'acceptance' of emission mitigation at sub-national level highly likely contains more uncertainties. Unlike the legislations and regulations are always top-down implements, community acceptance of cleaner goods usually falls to a sticky situation when residents would get a more expensive bill of living expense. On the one hand, environmental conservation responsibility is regulated in a blurry way in laws and ordinances of some developing countries which are usually too broad to be implemented because mixed regulations of environmental governance at different ranks of administrative hierarchy are expressed in a manner of "what should be" rather than "what in fact". The planning laws that try to fix this gray gap between "should be" and "be in fact", but on the other hand, regional cooperation for environmental conservation usually is very hard to be financed. Especially, market solutions for five key industries: manufacture, transportation, agriculture, tourism, and renewable energy are still seeking policy outlets of cleaner production for green growth. Thereby, environmental justice is stressed as the kernel concept of natural law by current academic community.
Intergeneration and intrageneration equality issues present environmental justice which is usually argued by social or private discount rate. Weitzman (1994) proposed an "environmental" discount rate to show that the social discount rate "ought to be" lower than the private discount rate because an increasing environmental payment would occur in the future. However, some empirical estimations disobey this theoretical results. Social discount rates (8-15%) in developing countries in general are higher than that in developed countries (3-7%), while private discount rates by survey estimates are much lower (1-3%) in all countries (Zhuang et al., 2007; Harrison, 2010) .
Environmental economists try to figure out this gap by valuing natural asset and seeking policy outlets of renewable energy, and aim to provide investment choices for heterogeneous demands at lower level of social structure, such as at community level, because heterogeneous groups may impede the energy policy being implemented uniformly (Bauwens, 2016) . Researchers currently prefer to estimate a willingness-topay (WTP) for initiative choice to renewable energy in Asia countries (Lee & Heo, 2016) . Moreover, such like China engages an ambitious agenda of urbanization which will bring a huge government investment on infrastructures, and force structural reformation in industrial structure, land use structure, resources and energy use (Forman & Wu, 2016) . Facing these gaps, we do not only need time, but tremendous investments to support economic growth, thus where are the energy policy outlets for community acceptance to invest and consume low-carbon choices?
China's legislations on environmental conservation and energy use
The People's Republic of China Environmental Impact Assessment Law was firstly promulgated on October 29 th in 2002 right after the sixth Environment Action
Programme of the European Community was implemented 1 , which clarified in the first 1 Recall a milestone on the 1972 Paris summit, European Economic Community (EEC) at the first time proposed the environmental policy framework. This historical mark stated that economic growth per se is not the ultimate target of economic development, instead, it should improve the living standard and healthy life quality, narrow down the income disparity in priority, and pay attention to intangible value of indigenous knowledge and environmental conservation for better serving humanity. During the thirty of 38 articles that "in order to implement the strategy of sustainable development, to prevent the adverse effects on the environment after the planning and construction project implementation, and to promote the economic, social and environmental coordinative development, this law is enacted." Contemporaneously, rural-urban transforming construction has been vigorously developed, which is so called the plan (Cao, Kleit & Liu, 2016) . On the positive side, fiscal policy stimulates high-tech firm establishment; on the other side, some inefficient innovation lead to financial losses (Huang et al., 2012 Carbon sequestration market may not satisfy current China's emission demands due to uncertainties (Ang, Su & Wang, 2016; Chen et al., 2013; . found that government policies for increasing energy efficiency in fact are always lagged behand carbon emission reduction in China. It infers that initiative mitigation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission at provincial level is more efficient than that at national level policy via a promising carbon trade mechanism (Zhou, et al., 2014; Zhang, 2015) . However, it is questionable that whether a promising financial system can efficiently allocate the uncertainties of climate changes to lower the risk of carbon market. Zhang, Jiao & Chen (2017) (Leete, Xu & Wheeler, 2013) . Many researchers make great efforts on valuing ecosystem service, however, such as carbon sequestration market cannot directly benefit to individuals. This situation is partially caused by unsharp rights of land and resource property rights with undefined spatial diversity in a community.
Different countries hold diverse characters of population and land resources. For instance, in USA, owning a piece of land means to own all resources under and above the surface of land, and where urbanization is prone to be an urban sprawl process, but this scheme is not appropriate to a populous country with less livable land resources.
Such like China, people do not be allowed to own a piece of land. Urbanization makes people crowd in the cities and left empty houses in rural hometowns. This leads to more intense resource and energy use at urbanizing area, and left poorly developed ecological conservation regions in rural places. Experiences from some European countries, some ventures can only own the land cover and above a certain height from the land cover by planning laws regulated. These clarifications of landscape rights let spatial diversities can be defined for benefiting to property management. Whereas, individual investment on ecological projects in China are impossible mainly because there is no a mechanism for separating space above the land and running it as a usual business.
How to price landscapes? Arguments are research methods of traditional costbenefit analysis based on local willingness-to-pay for public amenities of landscapes.
O'neill & Walsh (2000) This formative contract separates land property right and housing owning right, but so far there is no clearly separated priced landscape rights.
Public goods can be managed separately by people who are interested in monitoring their share of benefits from public goods, and earning profits from premium of environmental quality. China has a large population. With household income increases, people are getting attentions to environmental protection. Their strong demands currently are still hard to be priced. Carbon sequestration market provides opportunities to firms, but neglects individuals' willingness-to-pay for improving environmental quality. Crowdfunding of environmental conservation may be an outlet for investing renewable energy projects, aging public facilities, and other policypermitted preferences. This is a concept that the collaborative investment to an integrated management scheme makes profits for public common amenities. It means to share blurry rights of public properties but manage them in an individual's manner for earning profits together under an integrated scientific monitoring framework.
In the rest of paper, we will firstly introduce the case study design and describe survey data in section 2; then illustrate the empirical models of individual's willingnessto-pay for ecological investment in section 3; present results in section 4; discuss the relevant policy outlets in section 5; and give our conclusion in the last section 6.
Case study design and survey data
Beijing is the capital of P.R. of China. Until 2015, population was 21.705 million distributed in 16 districts. In previous research, we find that one percentage of population increases can lead to 1.96-2% of pooled growth rate of land use efficiency of built-up land changes during 2005 . It has violated the regional target of land use planning if the income effects do not be taken into consideration of estimation in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region of China. Strong ecological intercorrelation can increase over ten present of spillover effects exceeding backwardwave effect in this region . It implies that the increases of regional transportation demand with population increases are not the root of urban problems and environmental degradations. Over 88 percent of respondents agree with that road quality has a relationship with environmental quality. More roads in a well-designed transportation system do not have significantly negative impacts on environmental quality degradation (Deng et al., 2011; . Relationships between economic income distribution and spatial allocations of environmental amenities are critical points to urban growth and environmental quality improvement. Such as energy policies and environmental planning legislations are display vectors and enforcement bases to guarantee a rise of living standard. In this case, community acceptance and satisfaction of these stipulates represent the most of public options. Thus, we surveyed residents' willingness-to-pay for improving urban and peri-urban environmental infrastructures to environmental quality improvement (EI-Q) in Beijing, and asked their expected rate of return on ecological investment, then estimated impact factors to this private discount rate changes.
This basic idea is to invest their environmental funding share just like to manage their pension but do not be limited by residential locations; instead, they can own multiple permits of residential identification for temporally living in some government financed (or partial financed) nursing houses where are close to some ecological conservation parks. We asked a dichotomous question that "Do you think environmental protection benefit to future generation?" There were near to 95 percent of respondents who answered "Yes". Sequentially, we asked their expected rates of return on investment to keep environmental quality for future generation when they consider their investments as savings without time preference in Figure 1 . Table 1 (data sources by . Empirical model I: to estimate the uncertain gap between private and social discount rate of ecological investment. The social discount rate is prone to be a constant which can be shifted because of social norms or uncertainties of future (Baumol, 1968) .
The higher probability is that current generation concerns about future environmental issues and climate changes for their generations, the higher satisfaction of current income and consumption level will be reached; otherwise individual utility maximization can drag over-consumption of future benefits of natural environment.
Thereby, Weitzman (1994) proved that an environmental discount rate exists because there is a gap between private and social discount rate. Dasgupta (2008) 
where ecological investment denotes the attitude in between environmental conservation and resource consumption. If we suppose time preference is zero in advance, it implies all respondents are somehow unsatisfied about current environment.
The classical formula of discount rate (Ramsey, 1928) 
where the subjective social discount rate r is supposed as a constant, and µ is the uncertain private discount rate [pdr] 
The estimated social discount rate r of empirical model II can be reached by the estimated r plus the estimated uncertain part of private discount rate  from the empirical model I as shows by equation (5). Moreover, the subtracted difference between  and the estimated  times the total rate of consumption rise  of empirical model II approximately is the estimated time preference rate σ in equation (6), which can also test the deviation from our assumption in empirical model I that suppose the time preference rate is much close to zero. ˆˆrr  
To seek policy outlets of absorbing ecological investment, we will estimate marginal effects of respondent expected private discount rate that initiate the ecological investment share of per capita annual household income [y] for improving urban and peri-urban environmental infrastructures under their current attitude of consumption and awareness of ecological infrastructures. Recall equation (2), and suppose  that represents all the endogeneities, so that the marginal effects are the estimated subjective social discount rate of ecological investment to improve urban and peri-urban environmental quality as shows in equation (9-10 Therefore, we can reach the estimated private invest-return rate i calculated by the r subtracted from the r shown in the following equation (11), which illustrates that the environmental income effects initiate returns on ecological investment with aging effects for future environmental improvement.
Results
If people unsatisfy their current living status, their time preference can be much lower.
In this case, they prefer to consuming present more than saving for future consumption.
In empirical model I, we firstly suppose all respondents dissatisfy current environmental infrastructures, and then test the gap between the estimated subjective social discount rate and private discount rate of ecological investment to estimate the uncertain part of private discount rate. Thus, we reach the estimated social discount rates of ecological investment are about 12.8 % for improving urban environmental infrastructure, and 7.24% for peri-urban environmental infrastructure in Beijing. The estimated time preference rate is about 1‰ which is close to our assumption. In empirical model II, we test the endogeneities of income and saving rise to the change of this uncertain part of private discount rate. We estimate this can increase about 1.66%
to reach higher estimated subjective social discount rates about 14.46% for urban environmental infrastructures improvement, and increase 1.62% to reach 8.86% for peri-urban environmental infrastructures improvement. The estimated time preference rate then can increase to about 1.72‰. In empirical model III, we further estimated social discount rates of urban and peri-urban ecological investment by employing the predicted private discount rate (prediction of empirical model II), which are about 22% and 27.3%. Then, we reach the expected rate of return on ecological investment about 7.54% for urban environmental infrastructures improvement which is much lower than Table 2 .
From the results of empirical model I, the marginal coefficient of expected rate of return on ecological investment is 0.066, the coefficient of income rise is 0.075, and the sum of coefficients of satisfaction of current consumption and respondent awareness of ecological infrastructure is -0.831, then simply calculated the estimated social discount rate is 0.066+0.075*0.831=12.8% for urban ecological investment, and 7.24% for periurban ecological investment in the same way of calculation. Moreover, higher social status increase willingness-to-pay for ecological investment. Thus, higher income and saving increase ecological investment. It demonstrates the effects of income rises can initiate future returns on current ecological investment. Estimated respondent time preference for urban ecological investment is 0.066-0.075*0.831=0.0037, and -0.0024 is for peri-urban ecological investment, thus, the pooled estimated respondent time preference in Beijing about 1‰. It is close to our survey assumption that all respondents are somehow unsatisfied current environmental infrastructures.
From the results of empirical model II, we estimate the pooled endogeneities of impact factors to the expected rate of return on ecological investment changes. We find that economic status does not show statistically significant to alter the expected rate of return on ecological investment. While respondent current attitude of food and housing consumption and their social status are significant. It implies that economic status does not have too much influence to the expectation of returns on ecological investment.
Instead, their aging effect can initiate the expectation which further illustrates that people would like to pay for improving living environmental conditions for living longer when they are getting older. The coefficient of age to the expected rate of return on ecological investment is about 0.061, which means there is 6 percent of probability increases to respondent expected rate of return on ecological investment when getting older every one year old from the sample mean at 51 years old. We calculate the endogeneities of impact factors to the expected rate of return on urban ecological investment in next following year about (1+0.066)*1.5%+0.036*0.02=1.66%, which is the estimated coefficient of expected rate of return on urban ecological investment 0.066 in model I plus one and then times by the mean of survey respondent expected rate of return on ecological investment 1.5% to reach (1+0.066)*1.5%=0.0159, and then plus the product of the coefficient of income rise 0.036 and the sum of coefficients of satisfaction of current consumption and respondent awareness of ecological infrastructure -0.02; similarly, the endogeneities of impact factors to the expected rate of return on peri-urban ecological investment about (1+0.035)*1.5%+0.036*0.02=1.62%. Thus, we reach the updated estimated subjective social discount rate about 12.8% +1.66%=14.46% for urban ecological investment, and 7.24%+ 1.62%=8.86% for per-urban ecological investment. Furthermore, we can reach the updated estimated time preference rate about 1‰+0.036*0.02=1.72‰.
From the results of empirical model III, we estimate the subjective social discount rates with plugging the predictions of uncertain part of the private discount rate from model II which are about 22% for urban ecological investment, and 27.3% for periurban ecological investment. Thereby, the private estimated rate of return on ecological investment are about 22%-14.46%=7.54% for urban ecological investment, and 27.3%-8.86%=18.37% for peri-urban ecological investment when income rise and happiness increases by environmental infrastructures improvement to environmental quality improvement.
Table 2
Results of Empirical Model I~III on survey respondent expected rate of return on ecological investment to improve environmental infrastructures in urban and periurban area at Beijing of China, 2016.
Discussion
Empirical results have shown that ecological investment to improve environmental infrastructures based on individual willingness-to-invest can efficiently initiate a profit Opening the landscape rights to individual willingness-to-invest for improving environmental quality is a good option. improve environmental infrastructures about 20% in urban area, and 10% in peri-urban area. It can be explained by the Jevons' paradox that the more energy we current consume, the more energy we need for future consumption. This is the critical reason that low community acceptance to using renewable energy in developed countries because the price rise can be doubled. There are 72.7% of respondents in this survey who stated that they do not want to permanently move to other places mainly because their living habits, and they consider to move only if for a temporal recreation, so that near to 60% of respondents want to own two or more houses in both urban and rural area, but only less than 5% respondents aim to get returns on investment to real estate.
Therefore, policy outlets or central planning program to develop this kind of huge aging market with tourism development may be some good options.
Policy implications
More private investment and crowdfunding projects should be embraced to stimulate individual behaviors for public common will of environmental conservation. Because the efficiency of government investment for environmental governance is quite arguable in public opinions. For instance, reported by P.R. of China National Bureau of Statistics, ecological investment for forestry in Beijing accounts for 1.8 percent of the national total investment for environmental governance in 2015. Beijing municipal government announced to invest 760 billion CNY for environmental governance to reduce the haze. However, air pollution is still severe in Beijing. Thus, government investment to environmental governance is very debatable in urban laws, urban-rural planning, and political schemes in some regions.
Public opinions can be much influenced by local cultural factors. In the history of England and some other European countries, decentralization challenges the parliamentary system which let central policies become very hard to be accepted and implemented at community level mainly because of regional resource endowment.
Thereby, liberals incline to self-manage via free trade to promote higher income rise and limit endowment effects to make high-profit from monopoly and oligopoly production. In energy use, the feed-in tariffs policy is a kind of harmonious price strategy for adjacent regions to bargain the price of electricity. However, local myopic people much care about recent living cost and environmental changes rather than future grand-generations' benefits. This somehow lets other far sight local people lose the chance to invest green energy business. Particularly, in the information era, there are prosperous demands to join social groups and develop new-type of experiential business to help and make profit from far-sight investment to non-local regions environmental conservation. This differs from charity even if the invested place can be in physical distance far from daily living; and it differs from financial derivatives in virtual economy even if people can make profit from price rise of their subscribed rights.
The Coase theorem has proved the clarification of property benefit to improve economic efficiency. More importantly, Elinor Ostrom has provided evidence about selfish profit maximization can be compromised to a higher level of common profits from public choices. This is the core-concept of crowdfunding currently. Therefore, this paper provides some evidence of this core-concept that can be used to study the return on ecological investment for better saving energy and to make environment greener.
Conclusions
In this research, we estimate social discount rate of ecological investment for improving environmental infrastructures (including ecological infrastructures and public gray infrastructures) by using the survey data of private expected invest-return rate and its impact factors (including personal identity, social status, economic status, satisfaction of current consumption, and awareness of ecological infrastructures). Empirical model I~III report that there are some profit spaces for crowdfunding operation of private ecological investment aiming to improve environmental quality and develop the aging market. The estimated private invest-return rate can reach to 7.54% for urban and 18.37%
for peri-urban ecological investment.
Ecological investment to peri-urban environmental infrastructures has a higher invest-return rate because of the effects of income rises via individual choices of willingness-to-invest. The empirical model I reports that the estimated social discount rates of ecological investment are about 12.8 % for improving urban environmental infrastructure, and 7.24% for peri-urban environmental infrastructure in Beijing. The estimated time preference rate is about 1‰ which is close to our assumption that all respondents dissatisfied current environmental infrastructures. In empirical model II,
we test the endogeneities of income and saving rise to the change of this uncertain part of private discount rate, which can increase about 1.66% to reach a higher estimated subjective social discount rate about 14.46% for urban, and increase about 1.62% to reach 8.86% for peri-urban environmental infrastructures improvement. The estimated time preference rate can increase to about 1.72‰. In empirical model III, we further estimated subjective social discount rates of urban and peri-urban ecological investment by employing the predicted private discount rate (predictions of empirical model II), which are about 22% and 27.3%. Then, we reach the invest-return rates about 7.54% for urban environmental infrastructures improvement which is much lower than 18.37%
for ecological investment to peri-urban area.
Policy implication about satisfactions of energy use and housing are much sensitive to social discount rate changes, which can increase the dissatisfaction of residential happiness because of an increasing price mechanism when 'per capita' resource faces to decline. Therefore, we suggest opening the landscape rights to individual willingness-to-invest for improving environmental quality, and providing options to let people pay a part of their pensions for temporal permits to living in some well-served villages close to the places with advanced environmental amenities which are supported by central planning policy via the crowdfunding projects. This is the core-concept that the collaborative investment to an integrated management scheme makes profits for public common amenities. It means to share blurry rights of public properties but manage them in an individual's manner for earning profits together under an integrated scientific monitoring framework.
